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Abstract 
This study enhances the corporate governance literature by investigating the influence of blockholders on firm 
performance. Employing panel data estimations, this study works on a sample of 526 non-financial listed firms in 
Malaysia from 2006 to 2015. Overall, our findings reveal that firm performance is negatively associated with 
blockholders presence but positively related to blockholders total ownership concentration. Further examinations 
reveal that identity of blockholders matters in influencing performance of the firm. We also found that board 
governance mechanisms particularly independent directors and CEO duality play a significant monitoring role in 
relation to firm performance. More importantly, our findings are robust to a wide variety of performance measure 
which includes accounting, market and value based measures. Finally, findings of our study could facilitate the 
regulatory bodies and firm managers in promoting better and effective corporate governance in Malaysia. Investors 
may also benefit from our findings in understanding corporate governance of Malaysian firms and thus diversify 
their investment portfolios. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance literature states that concentrated ownership structure is one of the internal governance 
mechanisms generally applied in mitigating the agency conflict that arises between shareholders and firm managers. 
Ownership concentration in the hands of the large shareholders (blockholders) is anticipated to foster the alignment 
of interests between both parties to ensure that the shareholders get the maximum return for their investment 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In line with the agency theory¸ due to their sizable equity held, blockholders can play a 
significant role in governance as it provides them the incentives to bear the cost of monitoring managers. 
Nonetheless, it is argued that concentrated ownership benefits the firms only if the blockholders’ control rights do 
not exceed the cash flow rights (Denis and Mcconnell, 2003). Conversely, ownership structure that allows the 
blockholders to have control rights above the cash flow rights generally dampens firm performance and value. This 
is due to the claims that blockholders tend to have higher propensity to generate private benefits of control at the 
expense of the other minority shareholders.  
Blockholders are predominant not only across companies but also around the world. Claessens and Yurtoglu 
(2013), for instance disclose that essentially 50% of Malaysian firms are owned by direct large shareholders 
(blockholders). Hence, it is crucial to provide empirical evidence on the issue of the significance of blockholders 
influence and ownership on firm performance particularly in Malaysian context. Despite vast corporate governance 
literature, it is noted that studies related to the influence of blockholders on firm performance in Malaysia is 
somehow limited. In filling this gap, using a comprehensive sample of non-financial firms listed in Bursa Malaysia, 
the goal of this study is to empirically examine whether the blockholders (shareholders who own at least 5% of a 
company’s shares) presence and ownership  positively or negatively associated with firm performance. Besides, this 
study further explores the effect of various identities (types) of the blockholders namely family or individual, foreign 
institutional, domestic institutional as well as state or government on firm performance on the arguments that 
different types of blockholders varies in terms of their investment objectives as well as monitoring incentives. 
Within the presence of the blockholders, this study also examines the role of board governance mechanisms 
specifically board size, independent directors and CEO duality in relation to firm performance. Finally, our study 
contributes to the literature by providing robust estimates to a wide variety of performance measure which 
incorporates the value based measure alongside with other commonly employed accounting and market performance 
measures. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Theoretical Background 
Previous studies posit contradicting arguments based on different underlying theories pertaining to the influence 
of the presence of blockholders on firm performance. The first strand of arguments state that blockholders can exert 
governance through two main mechanisms thus lead to improved firm performance and value. The first mechanism 
relates to direct interventions by the blockholders on firms’ operations, or known as “voice” (Edmans, 2014). It is 
argued that the presence of the blockholders is desirable as they may provide advices on strategic decision makings 
and implementations, limit managerial discretions, increase monitoring and thereby reduce the agency costs (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). The second mechanisms involved selling of shares by blockholders in the case of 
underperformed managers or referred as “exit”. Due to this possibility, consecutively the manager has higher 
incentives in maximising the firm value in the first place (Edmans, 2014). On the other hand, the second strand of 
arguments highlight that blockholders may also exacerbate governance which is detrimental to firm performance and 
value. In line with the entrenchment effect hypothesis, blockholders could be seen as being unfair to the minority 
shareholders particularly by extracting private benefits of control for their own benefits instead of maximising the 
overall shareholders’ wealth (Edmans, 2014; Young  et al., 2008). Given these conflicting theories on blockholders 
and firm performance relationship, it is noted that prior empirical studies report mixed findings, and hence no 
consensus has been reached (see for instance, (Basu  et al., 2016; Konijn  et al., 2011; Nguyen  et al., 2015; 
Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
 
2.2. Identity of the Blockholders and Firm Performance 
Blockholders is defined as shareholders who own at least 5% of a firm’s shares (Denis and Mcconnell, 2003; 
Konijn  et al., 2011). It is argued that holding minimum threshold of 5% voting rights is considered as a strong 
control for the blockholders to influence firm performance and value. On this note, existing literature such as Ng 
(2015) and Basu  et al. (2016) further state that the power of these blockholders not only influenced by their 
ownership stakes but also the number of blockholders presence and their identities (types). As such, blockholders 
identities are significant in determining their relative motivations and power as they have diverse investment 
objectives, opportunities in making decisions as well as monitoring incentives.  
In reviewing the existing literature, it is noted that mixed findings were reported pertaining to the relationship 
between identity of the blockholders and firm performance. With regards to family or individual blockholders, one 
branch of studies demonstrates that family firms are more profitable than non-family firms. Consistent with efficient 
monitoring effect hypothesis by Jensen and Meckling (1976), one of the arguments of having family or individual as 
the majority shareholders (blockholders) is it could lead to better monitoring of the managers because it is predicted 
that family ties can improve the information flow among managers and owners. Besides, family or individual 
blockholders are claimed to have greater incentives for control and monitoring as the firm constitutes majority of 
their wealth as well as essential part of their patrimony (Isakov and Weisskopf, 2014; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
Miller  et al. (2007), also state that family blockholders value others’ perceptions towards their firms which 
encourage them to uphold their good reputations and professionalisms. Accordingly, this provides strong incentives 
for them to increase the overall firm performance instead of being purely self-centred. On the contrary, dominant 
family (individual) controlled firms are claimed to be relatively underperformed as they might emphasize on  their 
familial interest and firm survival at the expense of other shareholders (Ng, 2015). Besides, family firms are claimed 
to have less tendency investing in a value creating high risk project as they are less likely to seek fund from capital 
market as it could cause dilutions of their ownership (Boone  et al., 2011). 
Moreover, prior studies portray mixed findings with regards to performance of firms controlled by domestic 
institutions. Institutional investors commonly have larger equity stake are argued to have higher incentives in 
monitoring managers. As such Brickley  et al. (1988) state that some institutional investors are likely to be “pressure 
resistant” from firm managers contributing to better monitoring and reduce cost of agency conflict as they do not 
directly involved in the business. Conversely, other institutional investors appear to be “pressure sensitive” which 
lead them to become less effective in monitoring firm managers as consequently enable them to derive benefits 
because of close relationship with the firm (Al-saidi and Al-shammari, 2015; Ng, 2015). Apart from that, Lin and 
Chuang (2011) further argue that both pyramid and cross holdings ownership structure that are commonly practiced 
by domestic institutional investors particularly in the emerging market are among the significant causes of 
expropriation by majority shareholders (blockholders) that would adversely influence firm performance. 
Furthermore, numerous previous empirical works generally report that foreign institutional controlled firms are 
superior in performance. It is claimed that foreign-controlled firms have the advantage of being run and assists by 
professional managers as well as fund managers. As such, these managers would avoid investing in low profitability 
firms in maximizing their return on investment (Boone  et al., 2011; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). It is further argued 
that foreign institutional investors are more likely to be “pressure resistant” to firm managers, implying that they are 
capable of exercising effective monitoring thus improving firm value and performance (Ng, 2015; Young  et al., 
2008). 
A number of extant literatures provide evidence that state or government blockholders have a positive influence 
on firm performance. Al-saidi and Al-shammari (2015), for instance argue that state or government blockholders are 
considered as long term investors and easily obtain guarantees and support from government and state. While other 
studies reveal that state or government controlled firms produce inferior performance. Wiwattanakantang (2001) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicate that state or government owned firms are less effective as they may have other 
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social objectives or political mandates instead of increase firm performance and value. Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) 
further point out that state or government blockholders may not have high incentive in monitoring managers as their 
own wealth is not directly affected by suboptimal decisions made by firm managers.  
 
2.3. Board Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance 
Board governance is another internal corporate governance mechanism that plays a vital role in setting 
objectives and promoting firms’ effective control and monitoring (Denis and Mcconnell, 2003). As such board 
governance is supposed to act as a deterrent against any possible exploitative behaviour either by the controlling 
owners as well as the directors. Nevertheless, previous studies such as  Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) and Lin and 
Chuang (2011) argue that in a highly concentrated ownership structure, board governance functions appears to be 
less effective because of the control exerted by the majority shareholders (blockholders). For instance, one branch of 
studies state that appointing CEO as board chairperson (CEO duality) benefits the firm in terms of enhancing 
decision making process, having unified control and command systems as well as unconstrained leadership of the 
board (Gaur  et al., 2015; Sulong and Nor, 2010). Another studies however claim that CEO duality has a negative 
effect on firm performance as it may increase the convergence of control and ownership which will reinforce the 
expropriation by the majority shareholders (Lin and Chuang, 2011; Young  et al., 2008). 
Meanwhile, the agency theory highlight the positive impact of the presence of outside independent directors as 
they can better exercise their monitoring roles to avoid possible opportunistic behaviour and ensuring the board 
makes decisions that will benefit the interests of all shareholders and firms at large (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
However prior studies such as Gaur  et al. (2015) argue that  there is lesser need for monitoring role by the board 
(independent directors) if the majority shareholders effectively performs their role. With regards to board size, it is 
noted that one stream of literature is in favour for smaller board while others prefer larger board size. Larger board is 
argued to be more effective in monitoring roles and control activities of top management’s actions since it is 
relatively challenging for CEO to control larger boards (Sulong and Nor, 2010). However, the agency theory 
contends that large board tend to be less effective as it is difficult to coordinate and costly (Jensen, 1993). Besides, 
large board might be associated with of free-riding among the directors as well as the possibility of a dominant CEO 
control then board which eventually might deter the effectiveness of the board.  
 
3. Data Description and Methodology 
This study works on a sample comprises of 526 firms listed in Bursa Malaysia during the period of 2006 to 
2015. This study excludes financial firms, companies that were delisted as well as those without corporate 
governance reports over the period of analysis. Firms with at least one blockholder holding minimum 5% of the 
firms’ shares were one of the main criterions for firm selection. Additionally, all financial information was obtained 
mainly from Data-Stream and Osiris databases. While ownership and board governance data were manually 
collected from each company’s annual report.  
This study used panel data estimations which provides several advantages such as increase in number of data 
points and controlling for individual heterogeneity, thus allowing for more efficient and unbiased estimates (Baltagi, 
2003). Different methods of pooling panel data were involved which includes Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), 
Fixed Effect Model (FEM) and Random Effect Model (REM). Redundant Fixed Effect was carried out to compare 
between the Pooled OLS and FEM. The underlying assumption of the null hypothesis of Redundant Fixed Effect is 
that the effects are redundant. Rejecting the null indicates that FEM is more appropriate than pooled OLS model. 
Hausman specification test is then conducted in selecting whether FEM or REM is the most appropriate model. The 
underlying assumption of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that there is no correlation between the 
individual effects and the explanatory variables. Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that FEM is more 
appropriate over REM. Next, potential issue of heteroscedasticity is corrected by using robust adjusted standard error 
of cross-section SUR (PCSE). On top of that, multiple regressions were separately conducted due to due to near 
singular matrix issues specifically in examining the effect of the identity of the blockholders on firm performance.   
 
3.1. Variables of the Study 
The dependent variables are the performance indicators. Three measures were used namely Return on Assets, 
Tobin’s Q and Economic Value Added as proxies for accounting, market and value-based performance measures 
respectively. Higher Return on Assets signifies firm’s effectiveness in using its assets to serve the shareholders’ 
economic interests while higher value of Tobin’s Q may indicate better investor’s perceptions and expectations of 
the firm’s future performance, based on past and current performance. On the other hand, EVA is a measure of firm 
performance based on the residual income model and represents firm’s quality earnings because it shows the 
difference between the firm’s net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) and the total cost of all its form of capitals. 
Higher positive EVA implies that firm’s operating profit is sufficient in covering its cost of capital, thus portrays 
firm’s real profitability and how effective firm is performing (Stewart, 1991). Thus, using alternate performance 
measures will provide the robustness of our estimation results. 
Number of blockholders (blockholders presence) and their total ownership (blockholder ownership 
concentration) are among the main independent variables for this study. Besides that, these blockholders were then 
grouped according to their respective identities (types). Their identity includes family or individual, foreign 
institution, domestic institution and state or government. Meanwhile three board governance mechanisms were 
further examined namely CEO duality, total number of independent directors on board as well as board size. 
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Drawing from a review of the extant literature, three control variables that appear to have an influence on firm 
performance were included namely firms’ leverage, size and age. It is claimed that leverage plays a predominance 
role for solving the agency problem in which it may prevent managers in investing in value-destroying investments 
or projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In effect, greater leverage may also increases the agency cost as well as 
higher possibility of losing control of the firms. Prior studies such as Ng (2015) further highlight that firms with high 
level of leverage are exposed to higher financial risk and would negatively affect its profitability. Meanwhile, larger 
firms generally perform better because they are likely to be more efficient in their operation as well as able to exploit 
the advantage of economies of scale (Ng, 2015). Nevertheless, it is also argued that as firms become larger, they may 
suffer from diseconomies of scale, inefficiencies which eventually lead to inferior financial performance. The agency 
theory also posit that larger firm that are controlled by managers who exercise control in pursuing their self-interest 
may substitute firm’s objective of profit maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). With regards to firm age, older 
firms generally have greater advantages such as having greater access to capital market and enjoy the benefit of 
reputation, learning as well as experience (Sulong and Nor, 2010; Vieira, 2017). In contrast, it is argued that older 
firms are more likely to become inertia which loses their flexibility to adjust to rapid changing circumstances and 
consequently become less performed. 
The following table (Table 1) presents the abbreviations and descriptions of all the variables used in this study. 
 
Table-1. Description of Variables 
Variables Abbreviation Descriptions 
Return on Assets ROA Ratio between net profits to total assets 
Tobin’s Q 
 
TQ 
 
Ratio of book value of assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity to book value of assets 
Economic Value Added 
 
EVA 
 
Net operating profit after taxes less the cost of capital 
deflated by market value of equity beginning of year 
Blockholders BH Total number of blockholders 
Blockholders Ownership BHO Percentage of shares owned by all blockholders 
Family or individual 
blockholder 
FBH Percentage of shares owned by individual or family 
blockholders 
Foreign institutional blockholder FRBH Percentage of shares owned by foreign institutional 
blockholders 
Domestic institutional 
blockholder 
DBH Percentage of shares owned by domestic institutional 
blockholders 
State or government blockholder SBH Percentage of shares owned by state or government 
blockholders 
CEO duality DUAL Dummies where 1 denotes firms with CEO as board 
chairperson and 0 otherwise 
Independent directors IND Total number of independent directors on the board 
Board size BSZ Total number of directors on the board  
Firm leverage FL Ratio of total debt to total assets 
Firm size FS Log of total assets 
Firm age FA Total number of years since inception 
 
4. Empirical Findings and Discussions 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 offers the descriptive statistics about the variables used for this study. The mean values of ROA and 
Tobin’s Q are 5.08% and 1.039 respectively. While EVA on average shows a mean value of -0.125, indicating that 
the sample firms generate lack of real profit suggesting that their operating profits are insufficient to cover the cost 
of capital. Results also show that sample firms generally have almost 3 blockholders (mean value of 2.923) with total 
blockholder ownership of 47.88%. This result is comparable to the findings reported by Claessens and Yurtoglu 
(2013) that show about 50% of Malaysian firms are in the hands of the majority shareholders. With regards to the 
identity of the blockholders, this study revealed that domestic institutional constitutes the largest blockholders with 
the mean value of 29.299%. This is followed by family (individual) and foreign institutional with mean values of 
10.427% and 5.599% respectively. In the meantime, with a mean of 2.121%, state or government represents the 
smallest blockholders for the sample firms. Corroborating with the findings of the previous study by Al-saidi and Al-
shammari (2015), institutional blockholders generally own the largest shares compare to other types of blockholders.  
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Table-2. Descriptive statistics of all variables 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
ROA 5.080 4.770 212.220 -74.590 8.953 
TQ 1.039 0.821 65.160 0.172 1.322 
EVA -0.125 0.006 21.288 -22.290 0.896 
BH 2.923 3.000 8.000 1.000 1.393 
BHO 47.488 49.025 99.160 5.070 17.092 
FBH 10.427 0.000 72.700 0.000 15.792 
FRBH 5.599 0.000 99.160 0.000 14.340 
DBH 29.299 27.695 98.350 0.000 22.701 
SBH 2.121 0.000 73.910 0.000 9.734 
DUAL 0.105 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.306 
IND 3.268 3.000 8.000 1.000 0.979 
BSZ 7.375 7.000 17.000 3.000 1.834 
FL 19.822 17.560 291.620 0.000 16.861 
FS 8.603 8.532 11.069 6.954 0.612 
FA 25.924 21.000 108.000 2.000 17.794 
 
where ROA is the Return on Assets, TQ is the Tobin’s Q, EVA is the Economic Value Added, BH is the number 
of blockholders, BHO is the blockholder ownership, FBH is the family or individual blockholders, FRBH is the 
foreign institutional blockholders, DBH is the domestic instituional blockholders, SBHis the state or government 
blockholders, DUAL represents CEO duality, IND is the number of independent directors, BSZ is the board size, FL 
is the firms’ leverage, FS is the firms’ size and FA is the firms’ age. 
Furthermore, a low mean of 0.105 for CEO duality supports the separation role of the CEO and board 
chairperson. This indicates that the separation role of CEO and board chairman as required by Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (2017) is well observed. The results also demonstrate that on average there are 3 independent 
non-executive directors on the board (mean value of 3.268). This is consistent with the requirements stated on Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements (2016) which requires listed firms to have at least two directors or one-third of the 
board of directors to be independent directors. Besides, the results also show that board size has a mean value of 
7.375, indicating that board has an average size of 7 members. This corresponds with the recommended optimal 
number of board members to be within seven or eight members in order for a board to be more effective (Jensen, 
1993).  
As for control variables, firms’ leverage shows a mean value of 19.82% implying that overall external financing 
are less preferred by the firms in raising their fund. Meanwhile firm size proxied by log total assets has a mean value 
of 8.603 while average firm age since inceptions for firms understudy are generally 25 years (mean value of 25.92). 
 
4.2. Estimation Results 
The estimation results of the selected Fixed Effect Model (FEM) are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Findings 
display on Table 3 show that blockholders presence appears to have a significant negative association with ROA and 
EVA. Consistent with the previous studies of  Konijn  et al. (2011) a significant negative correlation show that 
higher number of blockholders is accompanied by lower firm performance. In line with the entrenchment effect 
hypothesis, the results appears to suggest that blockholders have higher tendency of securing private benefits for 
their preferential self-treatment at the expense of other shareholders instead of improving firm performance (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Young  et al., 2008). Meanwhile, a differing result of a positive significant relationship is found 
between ownership concentration by blockholders and firm performance using ROA. This result corresponds with 
the empirical findings of  Nguyen  et al. (2015) on the positive effect of concentrated ownership on performance. 
This finding seems to support the theory of “voice” of the blockholders as highlighted by Edmans (2014). This 
finding imply that holding a sizable firm’s equity enables the blockholders to have direct intervention on firm’s 
operation and monitoring management, thus produce superior performance. 
In addition, results displayed on Table 4 illustrate the findings for further examination on the identity of the 
blockholders. In line with the existing literature, our findings confirm that identity of the blockholders matters and 
have different influences in relation to firm performance. For firms controlled by family or individual blockholders, 
a positive significant relationship is found with accounting and value based performance measures (RAO and EVA), 
supporting the efficient monitoring effect hypothesis by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This finding is similar to 
Isakov and Weisskopf (2014) and Al-saidi and Al-shammari (2015), in which family presence seems to be 
advantageous as it helps to reduce the agency problem as well as the possible expropriation by the majority 
shareholders (blockholders) towards the minority shareholders. However, corroborating with Ng (2015), a negative 
significant association is evident for firms with individual or family blockholders and market measures (Tobin’s Q). 
In conformance with the entrenchment effect hypothesis, this finding suggests that investors might consider such 
firms may have high possibility of family opportunism and survival at the expense of other shareholders, which have 
a detrimental influence on firm value.  
Meanwhile, this study discloses that domestic institutional blockholders have a significant positive influence on 
ROA. It is noted that majority of the institutional investors in Malaysia are the investment and pension funds such as 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Tabung Haji (TH) and Employees Provident Fund (EPF). These investment 
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and pension funds are said to be “pressure resistant” from firm managers as argued by Young  et al. (2008). In this 
regard, they generally do not involve in direct business relationships and thus have the incentive to monitor 
management and thus reducing the information asymmetry associated with the separation of ownership and control. 
In other words, these institutional investors have greater ability and opportunity of monitoring managers in ensuring 
lesser self-serving behaviour, thus have a favourable impact on firm performance. 
 
Table-3. Estimation results for blockholders presence and concentration on firm performance 
 FEM FEM FEM 
Variable ROA TQ EVA 
C -41.9467** 6.7316** -4.2817*** 
 
(17.1434) (3.0213) (1.3452) 
BH -0.5314*** -0.0164 -0.0499** 
 
(0.1387) (0.0251) (0.0217) 
BHO 0.0459*** -0.0007 0.0029 
 
(0.0160) (0.0032) (0.0023) 
DUAL 1.7467** 0.0076 0.1461* 
 (0.7023) (0.0836) (0.0785) 
IND 1.0217*** 0.0651* -0.0142 
 (0.2533) (0.0334) (0.0244) 
BSZ -0.1996 0.0112 0.0135 
 
(0.1241) (0.0189) (0.0191) 
FL -0.1734*** 0.0029* -0.0090*** 
 
(0.0458) (0.0017) (0.0028) 
FS 6.7770*** -0.8156** 0.3678** 
 
(2.2263) (0.3750) (0.1437) 
FA -0.4058*** 0.0404*** 0.0428 
 
(0.0908) (0.0138) (0.0295) 
R
2
 0.4500 0.3981 0.1967 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3877 0.3300 0.1049 
F-statistic 7.2239*** 5.8468*** 2.1426*** 
 
where ROA is the Return on Assets, TQ is the Tobin’s Q, EVA is the Economic Value Added, BH is the number 
of blockholders, BHO is the blockholder ownership, DUAL represents CEO duality, IND is the number of 
independent directors, BSZ is the board size, FL is the firms’ leverage, FS is the firms’ size and FA is the firms’ age. 
*,**,*** Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
A positive significant coefficient for both Tobin’Q and EVA show that foreign institutional blockholders bring 
about an improvement in firm performance. Consistent with Boone  et al. (2011), it is plausible to claim that foreign 
fund managers put priority on projects that can contribute and resulted in maximizing their real profit and wealth. 
Besides, in agreement with prior studies such as Sulong and Nor (2010) and Ng (2015), foreign investors are likely 
to be “pressure resistant” to firm managers,  implying that they are capable of exercising effective monitoring thus 
improving firm value and performance. On the other hand, state or government blockholders are found to have no 
significant influence on firm performance. Similar to the previous empirical works such as Wiwattanakantang (2001) 
and Isakov and Weisskopf (2014), findings appear to suggest that state or government firms may be less effective in 
monitoring managers because of other social obligations or political objectives rather than maximizing firm value 
and performance. 
Results on Table 3 and 4 illustrate that board size exhibits no significant influence on firm performance using 
any of the performance measures. Consistent with the findings of Chen  et al. (2011), this evident seems to suggest 
that board size may be ineffective in monitoring activities as board size itself may be influenced by other governance 
mechanisms in relation to firm performance. This study documents a positive significant relationship between both 
independent directors and CEO duality on firm performance, measured by ROA. Similar to Sulong and Nor (2010) 
and Lin and Chuang (2011), higher number of independent directors is associated with greater firm performance. 
This indicates that board openness to outside directors contribute to better monitoring of the management behaviours 
as well as diffuses control among the shareholders.  As evident by the other empirical works of Gaur  et al. (2015) 
and Sulong and Nor (2010), findings of this study also appears to suggest that position of CEO and board 
chairperson should be hold by the same person to improve firm performance. Among the possible benefits of CEO 
duality includes unified and clear goal alignment, unconstrained leadership of the board as well as enhances decision 
making. This eventually enables firms to generate superior performance. 
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Table-4. Estimation results for identity of blockholders and firm performance 
 FEM FEM FEM 
Variable ROA TQ EVA 
C -43.5995** 6.8506** -4.4977*** 
 
(17.0652) (2.9947) (1.3655) 
BH -0.6899*** -0.0052 -0.0670*** 
 
(0.1413) (0.0246) (0.0219) 
FBH 0.1118*** -0.0081** 0.0088*** 
 
(0.0259) (0.0040) (0.0026) 
FRBH 0.0614* 0.0141** 0.0105** 
 (0.0318) (0.0065) (0.0042) 
DBH 0.0403** -0.0028 0.0010 
 
(0.0159) (0.0028) (0.0021) 
SBH -0.0162 -0.0081 0.0043 
 
(0.0439) (0.0069) (0.0058) 
DUAL 1.7349** 0.0340 0.1537* 
 (0.7059) (0.0809) (0.0801) 
IND 0.9932*** 0.0558 -0.0191 
 (0.2501) (0.0340) (0.0242) 
BSZ -0.1924 0.0192 0.0166 
 
(0.1230) (0.0190) (0.0191) 
FL -0.1740*** 0.0029* -0.0090*** 
 
(0.0459) (0.0016) (0.0028) 
FS 6.9653*** -0.8221** 0.3918*** 
 
(2.2174) (0.3693) (0.1451) 
FA -0.4028*** 0.0384*** 0.0428 
 
(0.0904) (0.0136) (0.0294) 
R
2
 0.4517 0.4026 0.2001 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3893 0.3346 0.1081 
F-statistic 7.2296*** 5.9213*** 2.1752*** 
 
where ROA is the Return on Assets, TQ is the Tobin’s Q, EVA is the Economic Value Added, BH is the number 
of blockholders, BHO is the blockholder ownership, FBH is the family or individual blockholders, FRBH is the 
foreign institutional blockholders, DBH is the domestic instituional blockholders, SBH is the state or government 
blockholders, DUAL represents CEO duality, IND is the number of independent directors, BSZ is the board size, FL 
is the firms’ leverage, FS is the firms’ size and FA is the firms’ age. *,**,*** Statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. 
Table 3 and 4 also displays the results pertaining to the control variables. Leverage is found to be negatively 
significantly associated with firm performance (ROA and EVA), indicating that firms with higher leverage 
underperform firms with lower leverage. This finding is thus consistent with previous empirical works such as Ng 
(2015) and Vieira (2017). A negative association between leverage and performance may imply that higher leverage 
increases the agency cost of monitoring managers. Besides, it also suggests that highly levered firm requires more 
resources to pay its debt commitment as well as lesser funds available for investment and shareholders. As a result, 
higher level of leverage eventually erodes firms’ profitably.  
Mixed findings are revealed in terms of the influence of firm size on performance. Firm size has a positive 
significant influence on ROA and EVA, while a negative significant impact on Tobin’s Q. Findings show that larger 
firms outperform smaller firms which is consistent with previous studies such as Ng (2015). This suggests that larger 
firms are prone to be more efficient and thus able to exploit the advantage of economies of scale. Conversely, as 
supported by other empirical studies namely Chen  et al. (2011), a negative correlation between size and 
performance signifies that larger firms is associated with inferior performance. This finding seems to support the 
conjecture of the agency theory that larger firms require more monitoring as firm managers may act for their own 
benefits instead of maximizing firm’s value and performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Furthermore, this study demonstrates that firm age is positively significant to Tobin’s Q but negatively 
significant to ROA. Consistent with Sulong and Nor (2010), firm age has a significant positive effect on 
performance suggesting that older and established firms have greater access to capital market which ultimately 
improve their values. On the other hand, corroborating with the previous empirical studies of Al-saidi and Al-
shammari (2015), older firms tend to be less profitable compare to younger firms. Among the plausible reason is that 
older firms tend to lose their flexibility in adapting to rapid changes in a highly competitive market, thus become less 
performed. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Our findings reveal that firm performance is negatively associated with blockholders presence but positively 
related to their overall ownership concentration. Although blockholders presence weakens firm performance, it is 
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also related with their level of ownership stakes. Our findings disclose that blockholders with higher level of equity 
owned is associated with better firm performance. Further examinations also reveal that the identity of the 
blockholders matters in influencing performance of the firm. Specifically, this study provides evidence that family or 
individual, domestic and foreign institutional blockholders are found to have a significant influence on firm 
performance. Additionally, board governance mechanisms particularly independent directors and CEO duality play 
an essential role in moderating the adverse effect of blockholders presence.  
Findings of this study have several significant implications such as facilitate the regulatory bodies and firm 
managers in promoting better and effective corporate governance in Malaysia. Investors may benefit from our 
findings in understanding corporate governance of Malaysian firms and consequently diversify their investment 
portfolios. Notwithstanding the findings discussed, future studies may want to incorporate other types of 
blockholders such as managerial blockholders as well examine the relationship among different types of 
blockholders. Future research could also consider other internal and external governance mechanisms in influencing 
firm performance. Finally, in investigating the generalization of our findings, this study can be replicated by future 
studies conducted across different sectors or industries in Malaysian market or between Malaysia and other 
developing countries or against other developed market. 
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